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WHEN PLAY BECOMES WORK:
CHILD LABOR LAWS IN THE ERA OF “KIDFLUENCERS”

MARINA A. MASTERSON†
In the past few years, “kidfluencers,” or children with large social media
followings, have been integral to the rise of an $8-billion social media advertising
industry. The most successful kidfluencers make up to $26 million in a year by posting
sponsored content and monetizing ad space on their social media pages. Because
kidfluencers have no legal right to these earnings or safe working conditions, the risk
of exploitation is extreme and immediate. Still, the issue is nuanced because parents
significantly control the production of their children’s online content, and states are
limited in how much they may regulate a parent’s decisions in raising their child.
This Comment addresses how kidfluencers fit in the child labor regime, specifically
by comparing child actor law. Child actors are not covered by federal statutory labor
laws, resulting in a patchwork of state regulations. This Comment proposes that states
should enact laws, akin to child actor Coogan Laws, to financially protect
kidfluencers. However, it concedes that certain common child actor regulations, like
those involving work permits and workplace conditions, are diﬃcult, if not impossible,
to impose on kidfluencers. Ultimately, current child actor laws should not simply be
expanded to include social media influencers, but instead, tailored legislation is
needed.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, viewers regularly tuned in to watch the seven Hobson children
play and laugh on their YouTube channel, Fantastic Adventures.1 The channel
had more than 700,800 followers and more than 242 million views.2 Not only
did the viewers beneﬁt from this free entertainment, but Machelle Hobson,
the channel’s producer and mother of the children, made nearly $300,000 from
the series.3
But if viewers could look through their screens and glimpse the real lives
of these young YouTube stars, they would ﬁnd that ﬁve of the seven Hobson
children had not attended school in years, according to police records.4 Their
mother reportedly took them out so they could focus on the YouTube series.5
The children said that if they forgot their lines or were diﬃcult during
The YouTube channel has since been deleted.
Julia Carrie Wong, ‘It’s Not Play if You’re Making Money’: How Instagram and YouTube Disrupted Child
Labor Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/apr/24/itsnot-play-if-youre-making-money-how-instagram-and-youtube-disrupted-child-labor-laws
[https://perma.cc/66KN-38CT].
3 Id.
4 YouTube Mom Charged with 30 Counts of Child Abuse, CBS NEWS (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:40 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/machelle-hobson-charged-youtube-mom-behind-fantasticadventures-channel-indicted-30-counts-child-abuse [https://perma.cc/U5N6-KPG5] [hereinafter
YouTube Mom Charged]; Wong, supra note 2 (quoting Pinal Cnty. Sup. Ct., 190313035, Release
Questionnaire: Machelle L, Logan D. Hackney, Ryan D. Hackney, https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/5776169/Reporte-De-Policia-Mujer-Arrestada.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X782-6K3Y]).
5 YouTube Mom Charged, supra note 4.
1
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production, their mother would beat, pepper-spray, molest, and starve them.6
Hobson pleaded not guilty to charges of child abuse.7
This tragic story reminds us that monetizing children risks
unconscionable exploitation, even by their own parents. What’s more, the
Hobson children had no legal right to the $300,000, even though it was earned
through their talents and sacriﬁces. States have not formally recognized social
media production as a form of labor or acting for adults or children, so these
entertainers have no speciﬁc labor protections.8
Children who have large social media followings, like the Hobsons, are
colloquially called “kidﬂuencers.”9 Unlike traditional child acting, parents do
not need industry connections or expensive acting classes to make their child
a social media star; they just need an idea, a social media account, some
ﬁlming skills, and luck. As part of a budding $8-billion industry,10 kidﬂuencers
make money both from companies that pay for the children to advertise their
products and from social media platforms that sell advertisement space on
kidﬂuencers’ channels.11 Some will even post content for a company in
exchange for free products instead of monetary compensation.12 Because
social media has turned children into potential sources of fame and income,
kidﬂuencers face many threats, including ﬁnancial exploitation, psychological
harm, and extreme loss of privacy.

Wong, supra note 2.
Jay Croft & Amanda Watts, YouTube Mom Pleads Not Guilty to Abusing Children, CNN (Mar.
29, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/29/us/youtube-mom-hobson-abuse-claimsplea/index.html [https://perma.cc/E7UR-TZVH].
8 Though states do not currently provide protections to inﬂuencers, the FTC has at least
recognized the industry in its Endorsement Guide, which says that inﬂuencers should disclose that
their endorsements are paid advertisements. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009).
9 See infra notes 31–47 and accompanying text.
10 Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Market in 2020,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inﬂuencer-marketingreport [https://perma.cc/V9ZS-HZEF].
11 See Sapna Maheshwari, Online and Making Thousands, at Age 4: Meet the Kidfluencers, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/media/social-mediainﬂuencers-kids.html [https://perma.cc/3VER-95BG] (reporting that some kidﬂuencers make up to
$50,000 per sponsored video); Elizabeth Gravier, This Millennial Farmer Makes 5 Times More Money
from His YouTube Channel than His Crops—Here’s How, CNBC MAKE IT (Nov. 27, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/27/how-much-money-a-social-media-inﬂuencer-makesfarming.html [https://perma.cc/65PZ-6S88] (reporting on how one inﬂuencer makes money
through advertisements and sponsorship deals).
12 Sapna Maheshwari, Are You Ready for the Nanoinfluencers?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/11/business/media/nanoinﬂuencers-instagram-inﬂuencers.html
[https://perma.cc/3U42-H59L] (explaining that brands will give nanoinﬂuencers—inﬂuencers with
between approximately 1,000 and 5,00 followers—free products in exchange for the inﬂuencer’s
posts about the product, rather than money).
6
7

580

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 577

In this Comment, I propose that state governments need to ﬁnancially
protect child social media inﬂuencers. Some states have enacted labor and
family statutes to protect traditional child actors from harm, though they do
not extend to kidﬂuencers. A notable way that some states protect child actors
is through Coogan Laws.13 These laws generally mandate state-approved
work permits and require that a certain percentage of the child actor’s
earnings be protected in a trust account, rather than under the control of the
parents.14 States should require Coogan trusts for high-earning social media
inﬂuencers to protect against ﬁnancial exploitation,15 though permits and
other production regulations common for child actors are less easily applied
in this context.
Though simple in theory, this proposed expansion of labor law raises a
host of uncharted policy decisions. As an illustration, California attempted to
extend its Child Actor’s Bill to social media inﬂuencers, but the provision was
entirely removed before the bill’s amendments passed.16 Kansen Chu, the
California Assemblymember who introduced the so-called “kidﬂuencer”
provision, pointed out the novel challenges of applying existing Coogan Laws
to this industry, including how to regulate compensation in the form of
“tickets and toys and clothes and other little things.”17 As a solution to this
particular issue, this Comment proposes that Coogan requirements should
only apply to contracts worth $500 or more because it allows the most
commodiﬁed kidﬂuencers to receive immediate protection while the industry
works out how and if to regulate other forms of compensation.18 This is just
one example of the open issues addressed in this Comment that need further
exploration before another bill is likely to succeed.
While states are considering protective measures, they must bear in mind
that child labor law inherently conﬂicts with family law and the constitutional
right to parental authority, particularly in the social media context. Parents
traditionally have the right to raise their children how they see ﬁt,19 but that
right is not without limits.20 Social media production is often overseen by the
See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.
Id.
During the editing of this Comment, France became the ﬁrst country to pass such a law,
protecting the earnings of child inﬂuencers and limiting the hours they can work. France Passes New
Law to Protect Child Influencers, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-54447491 [https://perma.cc/U5PC-2ZPV].
16 Assemb. B. 2388, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced).
17 Wong, supra note 2.
18 Infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) as the two foundational cases for the constitutional
right to parental authority).
20 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (holding that the state may impose
restrictions on parental authority in the interest of child welfare).
13
14
15
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parents within their own home, and it can look like family play, not work.21
But at the same time, parents of kidﬂuencers may have perverse motivations
when they stand to gain fame and money from exploiting this “play.”22 Thus,
states must balance the right to family autonomy with the interest in
protecting child performers.
This Comment explores the history of child labor laws and its interaction
with entertainment industries, concluding that social media inﬂuencers
require similar, but not identical, protections to traditional child actors. There
are new calls for regulation in this ﬁeld,23 but this Comment is the ﬁrst to
take an in-depth look at the family law implications and address how
workplace regulations, like hour limits and tutoring requirements, struggle to
ﬁt in this context. Protecting child earnings through Coogan trusts is a
practicable way to ﬁnancially protect kidﬂuencers, but regulating the content
production itself is more diﬃcult. Many states have permit and workplace
requirements in studio production to address things like health and
education,24 but these regulations are largely unworkable in the fast-paced
21 For example, Ryan Kaji, the star of a YouTube channel called Ryan’s World, rose to fame
after his parents began posting videos of him playing with new toys and reviewing them. See Amanda
Perelli, 8-Year-Old Ryan Kaji is the World’s Top-Earning YouTube Star. His Parents Took Us Inside His
Business, Which Had Over $200 Million in Retail Sales Last Year and Employs a 30-Person Production
Team, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-ryans-worldbusiness-interview-youtube-tv-toys-2020-9 [https://perma.cc/WLW4-4EJN]. He is now the
highest-paid YouTube star in the world, earning about $20 million from YouTube and more than
$200 million in retail sales in 2019. Id. His channel posts videos most days and, since its creation in
2015, has posted at least 1,830 videos at the time of writing. Ryan’s World, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/c/RyanToysReview/featured[https://perma.cc/MMY3-UX5F].
22 See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
23 See Assemb. B. 2388, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced by Assemb. Chu, Feb. 14, 2018)
(demonstrating a legislative effort in California to include social media influencers under child actor laws);
Neyza L. Guzman, The Children of YouTube: How an Entertainment Industry Goes Around Child Labor Laws, 8
CHILD & FAM. L.J. 85, 109-10 (2020) (presenting three possibilities for reform to protect child video
bloggers); Erin E. O’Neill, Influencing the Future: Compensating Children in the Age of Social-Media Influencer
Marketing, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 45 (2019), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/influencingthe-future/ [https://perma.cc/W3PP-A2MT] (proposing that social media influencers be included under
child actor laws to compensate children for their loss of privacy); Harper Lambert, Why Child Social Media
Stars Need a Coogan Law to Protect Them From Parents, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 20, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/why-child-social-media-stars-need-a-coogan-law-protectparents-1230968 [https://perma.cc/7V6N-ZRUL] (reporting on the public discourse surrounding
kidfluencer regulation); Wong, supra note 2 (discussing ongoing legislative efforts to improve Coogan laws);
Mike Wright, YouTube ‘Kidfluencers’ at Risk of Exploitation, Children’s Commissioner Warns, TELEGRAPH (Sept.
20, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/20/youtube-kidfluencers-risk-exploitationchildrens-commissioner [https://perma.cc/7NXW-S25V] (describing efforts in the United Kingdom to
regulate kidfluencers).
24 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 § 186-2.1(e) (2017) (requiring child actors in
New York to apply for a state-issued work permit); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11753(a) (2020)
(requiring child actors in California to apply for a state-issued work permit); id. § 11760 (limiting
the number of hours child actors may work in a day and mandating the number of hours of schooling
they need per day); id. § 11755.2 (requiring studios to provide a teacher for minors while on set).
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social media context, which is generally conﬁned to the family unit. Thus,
states should appropriately analyze these issues before simply including
kidﬂuencers under existing child actor regulations.
Part I discusses the rise of “inﬂuencing” as a multibillion-dollar industry,
ripe for regulation. Part II provides an overview of the history of child labor
laws to help explain why child actors, and likely kidﬂuencers by extension,
are excluded from federal labor law coverage. This history has resulted in
piecemeal regulation of child actors under state law, which becomes an issue
given the mobile nature of social media production. Part III explains why
social media production is work, not play, even though it is often performed
at home within the family. This work makes child stars vulnerable to risks
including ﬁnancial exploitation, psychological harm, and unprecedented loss
of privacy. While states have an interest in protecting kidﬂuencers from these
harms, this context is uniquely family based, with parents often directing the
production and using the platforms, not only for proﬁt, but also as unpaid
expression and recreation. Thus, states must balance parental rights against
the interest in protecting child performers. Finally, Part IV proposes a partialprotection plan that states should adopt. Financial protection is immediately
possible through Coogan Laws, but regulating the content production itself
presents new and challenging questions that require states to consider the
speciﬁc needs of the social media industry.
I. THE RISE OF KIDFLUENCERS
“Samia’s birth video is on YouTube, so she’s pretty much been born into
social media.”25 LaToya Ali, the mother of four-year-old inﬂuencer Samia, is
not alone in introducing her child to the world of social media, even before
birth. According to a 2010 study, more than 90% of two-year-olds in the
United States have an online presence.26 This phenomenon of parents sharing
content of their children, sometimes called “sharenting,” has garnered
signiﬁcant public concern.27 Still, a 2015 report by Pew Research Center found
Maheshwari, supra note 11.
Adrienne Lafrance, The Perils of ‘Sharenting’, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/babies-everywhere/502757
[https://perma.cc/KN5V-QWD3].
27 See, e.g., id. (discussing the importance of online privacy for children); Anya Kamenetz, Opinion, The
Problem with ‘Sharenting’, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/opinion/childreninternet-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/N98V-9USW] (describing the potentially damaging effects of
sharenting, such as the selling of children’s personal information to advertisers and risking discovery of
potentially damaging information about the child by future employers); Hua Hsu, Instagram, Facebook, and
the Perils of “Sharenting”, NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culturalcomment/instagram-facebook-and-the-perils-of-sharenting [https://perma.cc/LLR4-DTZK] (discussing
how sharenting exposes children to the larger digital world without their consent, robbing them of
their agency).
25
26
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that 75% of parents use social media, and 88% of all parents said they feel
comfortable when content is posted about their child on social media.28
The word “influencer” was added to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary in
2019 and refers to “a person who is able to generate interest in something (such
as a consumer product) by posting about it on social media.”29 Though
influencing is a remarkably new phenomenon, a study found that 54% of
surveyed Americans between the ages of 13 and 38 would become an influencer
if they could and 86% are willing to post sponsored content for money.30
“Kidﬂuencers” are children with large followings on social media and,
most importantly to this Comment, who receive compensation for posting
sponsored content.31 Twenty-ﬁve-year-old inﬂuencer Ross Smith described
the rise of kidﬂuencers concisely: “Kids are the new social
inﬂuencer . . . . Kids grow up and become less relevant. The sweet spot is
between 2 and 4, [after which] they’re not that cute.”32 Indeed, research has
shown that videos featuring a child under 13-years-old receive three times as
many views as those without children.33 The social media marketing industry
relies on parents dressing up their toddlers, feeding them lines that they may
not understand, and advertising products that they may have never used.
Whatever moral hesitation we have with the kidﬂuencer industry, the ship
may well have sailed—the inﬂuencer marketing industry was worth as much
as $8 billion in 2019 and is still expanding.34 One parent told The New York
Times that their child can fetch up to $45,000 for posting a sponsored YouTube

28 Maeve Duggan, Amanda Lenhart, Cliﬀ Lampe & Nicole B. Ellison, Parents and Social
Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 16, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/07/16/parentsand-social-media/#fnref-13802-3 [https://perma.cc/FS5F-TCJB].
29 Influencer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inﬂuencer
[https://perma.cc/2NTG-S3AV].
30 The Influencer Report: Engaging Gen Z and Millennials, MORNING CONSULT,
https://morningconsult.com/inﬂuencer-report-engaging-gen-z-and-millennials/
[https://perma.cc/F5QZ-QQHC]; see also The LEGO Group Kicks Oﬀ Global Program to Inspire the
Next Generation of Space Explorers as NASA Celebrates 50 Years of Moon Landing, LEGO (July 15, 2019),
https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/news/2019/july/lego-group-kicks-oﬀ-global-program-toinspire-the-next-generation-of-space-explorers-as-nasa-celebrates-50-years-of-moon-landing
[https://perma.cc/LU7L-5YUC] (referencing a survey of 3,000 children that found kids are three
times more likely to aspire to be a YouTuber than an astronaut).
31 See Maheshwari, supra note 11.
32 Katherine Rosman, Why Isn’t Your Toddler Paying the Mortgage?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/style/viral-toddler-videos.html
[https://perma.cc/5BSHSTK4] (quoting Ross Smith).
33 Patrick Van Kessel, Skye Toor & Aaron Smith, A Week in the Life of Popular YouTube Channels,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/07/25/a-week-in-thelife-of-popular-youtube-channels/ [https://perma.cc/V3B6-DZAZ].
34 Schomer, supra note 10.
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video.35 The highest-paid YouTuber in 2019 was eight-year-old Ryan Kaji,
who made $26 million in one year for posting videos reviewing toys.36
Kidﬂuencers make money in a few ways. First, they may receive
compensation for sponsored content. Companies like Walmart, Mattel Toys,
and Crayola will pay the child to post videos playing with their products as
an advertising scheme.37 The second main source of income is Google
AdSense,38 an advertising program that allows Google to run ads on
inﬂuencers’ YouTube accounts and pays the inﬂuencer on a per-click basis.39
Inﬂuencers also make money through merchandise and other related
contracted work.40
Given the potential for high sums of money, parents have a signiﬁcant
incentive to create as much content as possible. One family posted more than
250 YouTube videos of their children in a four-year span,41 and Ryan Kaji’s
channel accumulated at least 1830 videos42 over a ﬁve-year span.43 By my
count at the time of writing, the Stauﬀer family, which has nearly 4 million
Instagram followers, posted content of their young daughters on their
Instagram account 142 times in 2019, not including temporary Instagram
stories which delete after twenty-four hours or posts on other social media
platforms.44 The Stauﬀers’ account features sponsored content and product
placement by companies including Disney,45 Nickelodeon,46 and Amazon.47
Maheshwari, supra note 11.
Madeline Berg, The Highest-Paid YouTube Stars of 2019: The Kids are Killing It, FORBES (Dec.
18, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2019/12/18/the-highest-paid-youtubestars-of-2019-the-kids-are-killing-it [https://perma.cc/7RWP-NZVW].
37 Maheshwari, supra note 11.
38 We Value Your Content, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start
[https://perma.cc/Q5H2-FP2Z].
39 Gravier, supra note 11.
40 See, e.g., Perelli, supra note 21 (reporting that, in 2019, YouTube star Ryan Kaji made $20
million directly from YouTube, an additional $200 million in retail sales from branded products, and
also starred in Nickelodeon and Roku shows that capitalized on his YouTube fame).
41 Wright, supra note 23 (“Those videos have now been viewed more than ﬁve billion times and
last year earned the channel more than £1.2 million in advertising revenue.”).
42 YOUTUBE, youtube.com (search “Ryan’s World”) (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
43 Uploads,
Videos
in
Ryan’s
World,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com
/c/RyanToysReview/videos?view=0&sort=da&ﬂow=grid [https://perma.cc/YSS4-ZCEV].
44 Stauﬀer Family (@kcstauﬀer), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/kcstauﬀer/?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/H9AK-V24C].
45 Stauﬀer Family (@kcstauﬀer), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/
p/B2XEhoagtq3/ (video of the children dancing with Mickey Mouse as a paid partnership with
Disney Junior).
46 Stauﬀer Family (@kcstauﬀer), INSTAGRAM (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/
p/B5_mW1tBVpF/ (picture of the kids watching Nickelodeon’s “Blue’s Clues & You” to promote its
new episodes).
47 Stauﬀer Family (@kcstauﬀer), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/
p/BYE8sqWnz-8/ (picture of the daughters playing with art supplies to advertise Amazon’s back-toschool oﬀerings).
35
36
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This industry introduces opportunities for wealth to virtually any family
with a camera and internet access, and also the risk that parents seeking fame
or money will exploit their children at the expense of education and welfare.
In response to these concerns, there have been some lobbying eﬀorts to
protect kidﬂuencers under existing child actor laws, though these eﬀorts have
been primarily focused in California.48
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CHILD ACTOR LAW
To understand how (and if) the child labor regime accommodates child
actors and now social media inﬂuencers, we start by considering its origins.
Advocates fought hard for federal child labor regulation, and for over eighty
years, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 has protected American child
workers from perhaps the most hazardous and exploitative occupations while
symbolically prioritizing education over labor.49 But, as this Comment
discusses, national child labor laws were never concerned with less traditional
forms of labor and intentionally leave children exposed in certain industries.
The underlying purposes of federal child labor law do not encompass
social media work. Accordingly, like for child actors, protections for child
social media stars are likely to be addressed on a state-by-state basis. This
section discusses how child acting fell under the purview of state law and how
states have attempted (or failed) to protect child performers.
A. A Brief History of Child Labor Laws
One need not look far back in American history to ﬁnd the oppressive
circumstances that motivated the child labor law movement. At the turn of
the twentieth century, an estimated 400,000 children were employed in New
York alone.50 The increase in the child labor force coincided with a national
urbanization, so many children worked in industrial cities.51 Factory work
involved sawdust-ﬁlled air, exposure to open ﬁre, dangerous chemicals, and
crude machinery.52 Because they were often given the least desirable jobs in
these workplaces, one book estimated that boys under sixteen-years-old had

See sources cited supra note 23.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, § 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 212).
50 Seymour Moskowitz, Dickens Redux: How American Child Labor Law Became a Con Game, 10
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 89, 102 (2010).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 103–04, 103 n.60.
48
49
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twice as many workplace accidents as adult men and girls under sixteen had
three times as many accidents as adult women.53
Despite these clear dangers, much of the public was resistant to child labor
regulations, in part because families relied on their children’s income.54
Traditionally, and as this Comment will explore in relation to child actors,
parents have the right to their child’s income, which incentivizes putting one’s
child to work.55 This was important at the turn of the twentieth century when
a large number of families were struggling economically.56 Thus, the
American economy and family depended on child labor much more than is
standard today.
Even against this resistance to child labor restrictions, the early 1900s
harbored unprecedented momentum in the child labor rights movement. This
movement, paired with growing public concern over the dangers of child
labor, led 42 states to adopt child labor legislation by 1906.57 At the federal
level, however, attempts at labor reform were derailed by the Lochner era
debates over federal power. When the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) eventually passed and earned validation by the Court,58 it contained
a child labor provision banning “oppressive child labor.”59 This meant that
children under fourteen could not be employed, fourteen- and ﬁfteen-yearolds could work except under oppressive conditions, and sixteen- and

53 EDWIN MARKHAM, BENJAMIN B. LINDSEY & GEORGE CREEL, CHILDREN IN BONDAGE
158-59 (1914).
54 See Moskowitz, supra note 50 at 101–02 (“Parents commonly sent their children to work and
often opposed child labor reform because of the desperate need for additional income.”); VIVIANA
A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 66-70 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (1985)
(discussing the middle-class resistance to child labor laws because of reliance on children’s income,
especially when children could often make more money working than adults).
55 See Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co., 13 A. 975, 976 (Pa. 1888) (“It is a rule as old as the common
law that the father is entitled to the custody and control of his minor children, and to receive their
earnings.”); see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7503 (West 2020) (“The employer of a minor shall pay
the earnings of the minor to the minor until the parent or guardian entitled to the earnings gives
the employer notice that the parent or guardian claims the earnings.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.2
(2020) (stating that parents are generally entitled to the earnings of their minor children); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:1-1 (West 2020) (same for New Jersey); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-1 (2020) (same
for Rhode Island).
56 This was especially true for the more than ten million immigrants who moved to the United
States between 1860–1890 and needed their children to work to make ends meet. See Moskowitz,
supra note 50 at 101 n.49, 102 (citing OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
2002
YEARBOOK
OF
IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
11,
http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2002/IMM2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/54BB-5LVD]). At the
same time, children in the post-Civil War South were encouraged to work in the growing textile
mill industry as a cheap substitute for the men lost in the war. Id. at 101.
57 41 CONG. REC. 1809–1810 (1907).
58 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941).
59 52 U.S. Stat. 1060, 1067 § 12(a)(1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 212).
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seventeen-year-olds were only restricted from “particularly hazardous”
occupations.60
Today, the oppressive labor that the FLSA was built upon has largely
disappeared in America. The great majority of work currently performed by
children is in relatively safe industries, like babysitting and yardwork, and is
concentrated outside of the school calendar.61 But still, approximately 150,000
children are employed in violation of the FLSA in any given week, most often
because they are working excessive hours or hazardous jobs before the age of
eighteen.62 And just because the nature of the work has changed from
industrial factories and mines to restaurants and retail does not mean that the
law should cease to protect child workers from modern harms.
B. Child Actor Protections
Having reviewed the history of federal child labor protections, it should
be no surprise that child acting is excluded from its scope. Since its origins,
the FLSA has been limited to only “oppressive” child labor, and thus the Act
categorically excludes certain employment.63 Relevant here, federal child
labor laws do “not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in
motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television
productions.”64
Child acting is exempted from the FLSA for two primary reasons. First,
Congress did not consider child acting to be oppressive but rather an
opportunity for children to develop talents.65 And second, child actress
Shirley Temple had great fame during the statute’s construction and passing,
and if Congress had barred children under 16 from acting, she would have
been restricted from performing.66 The FLSA exemption for child actors has
accordingly been coined “the Shirley Temple Act.”67
Because of this federal exemption, child-actor law is state-based. This has
resulted in wide variance among protections depending on where the child is
Id. at 1061 § 3(l).
HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 295-97 (2002); Michael
Schuman, History of Child Labor in the United States—Part 2: The Reform Movement, MONTHLY LAB.
REV. (Jan. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/history-of-child-labor-in-the-unitedstates-part-2-the-reform-movement.htm [https://perma.cc/CD6H-9N92].
62 HINDMAN, supra note 61 at 298.
63 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)–(d) (providing the exemptions to federal child labor provisions,
including certain agricultural workers, newspaper deliverers, child performers, and other speciﬁc
jobs).
64 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(3).
65 82 Cong. Rec. 1780 (1937); 83 Cong. Rec. 7441 (1938).
66 Kimberlianne Podlas, Does Exploiting a Child Amount to Employing a Child? The FLSA’s Child
Labor Provisions and Children on Reality Television, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 39, 57-58 (2010).
67 Id. at 58.
60
61
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working, with states like California and New York providing rigorous
protections, and states like Mississippi providing no speciﬁc protections at
all.68 Indeed, seventeen states do not regulate child entertainment
employment, and twenty-four states do not require children to have work
permits for entertainment work.69 Thus, child actors in America have been
subject to unequal and often insuﬃcient protection depending on where their
work is performed.
Kidﬂuencers would likely fall under the same FLSA exemption because
they share the relevant characteristics of child acting—namely that
entertainment work is often viewed as non-oppressive labor that actually
beneﬁts children more than it harms them.70 Alternatively, kidﬂuencers may
not receive protection because the FLSA also exempts children employed by
their parents from child labor regulation.71 Though it is debatable whether
kidﬂuencers are in fact employed by their parents, both of these exemptions
are conceivable grounds to exclude kidﬂuencers from FLSA coverage.
Even so, social media production is particularly suited for federal
regulation and may merit its own legislation to circumscribe the FLSA
exemptions. Internet entertainment and advertising are necessarily
interstate.72 And because of the mobility of social media content production,
a state-based regime presents a real risk of forum-shopping that could be
prevented with a federal scheme. Nevertheless, this Comment focuses on
possible state regulation of the social media industry because of its similarities
to child acting, which has never been federally regulated.

68 Child Entertainment Laws as of January 1, 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 2020),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor/entertainment [https://perma.cc/H4FB-L47M].
69 Id.
70 See 82 CONG. REC. 1780 (1937) (“Employment of these few children gives us pleasant and
wholesome entertainment and the child is given the opportunity of displaying his or her talent which
they love.”).
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) (excluding children employed by parents from the deﬁnition of
“oppressive child labor”); 29 CFR § 570.126 (2020) (explaining that the exclusion applies to children
in most industries as long as they are employed exclusively by the parent and not any secondary
employer). Though neither New York nor California exempt parents employing their own children
from child labor regulations (except for certain industries, like farming), a state could choose to do
so, which creates even greater need for new legislation for kidﬂuencers. See, e.g., 5 VA. CODE ANN.
§ 40.1-79.01 (2020) (exempting children employed by their parents in occupations other than
manufacturing from child labor provisions).
72 Congress said as much in its ﬁndings that “[t]he Internet is well recognized as a method of
distributing goods and services across State lines” and “using the Internet constitutes transportation
in interstate commerce.” Eﬀective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358,
§ 102(6)–(7), 122 Stat. 4001, 4002 (codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
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C. Development of Coogan Laws
California is credited with spearheading child-actor protections through
the enactment of its Coogan Law.73 Jackie Coogan was a famous child
comedian who starred in Charlie Chaplin’s ﬁlm The Kid in 1919.74 Upon his
twenty-ﬁrst birthday, after his ﬁlm career had ended, he discovered his
parents had drained his earnings.75 In California at the time, parents owned
the earnings of their minor children, so Coogan had to sue his mother and
former manager to recover some of his earnings.76 In response, California
enacted its so-called Coogan Law in 1939.77
Coogan Law refers to the state requirement that the parent or guardian
of the child actor set up a blocked trust account for the child, into which 15%
of the minor’s acting wages are deposited until the child turns 18 years old.78
For most of the twentieth century, California’s Coogan Law had a serious
ﬂaw—Coogan trusts could only be created upon court approval of the
contract.79 This meant that, in 1999, about 95% of contracts with child
entertainers did not have Coogan protection because many families never
sought court approval.80 In the 5% where court approval was sought, it was
typically by the employer out of concern that the child would attempt to avoid
the contract and not out of interest in protecting the child.81
In 1999, California amended its law to no longer require court approval
and, quite signiﬁcantly, to give sole property rights to the child for all
earnings generated under the employment contract.82 Today, California’s
Coogan Law is expansive—it requires entertainment employers to receive the
written consent of the state Labor Commissioner to employ a minor under
sixteen and to deposit 15% of the child’s gross earnings into a blocked trust.83
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020).
Coogan Law, SAG_AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/membership-beneﬁts/youngperformers/coogan-law [https://perma.cc/E7WB-JEJ2].
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 637, § 1, at 2064-65 (1939) (California’s ﬁrst Coogan Law).
78 As originally enacted in 1939, courts had discretion to choose what percentage of earnings
should be directed to the trust account. Id. Today, California speciﬁes that 15% must be set aside for
the child’s trust. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020).
79 Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt to Secure Financial Futures for Child
Performers, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 204 n.28 (2000).
80 Id.
81 Id; see also, Podlas, supra note 66 at 70 n.253 (“The limited body of case law on the subject
suggests that the Coogan law provided far more protection to ﬁlm makers than to child actors.”)
(quoting Marc R. Staenberg & Daniel K. Stuart, Children as Chattels: The Disturbing Plight of Child
Performers, BEVERLY HILLS BUS. ASS’N J., Summer/Fall 1997).
82 S.B. 1162, 1999 Leg. (Cal. 1999) (enacted); see also Christiano, supra note 79, at 206 (“The
child’s family no longer has the right to claim a portion of the child’s earnings for family use.”).
83 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020).
73
74
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If the child actor’s parents do not set up a Coogan trust, the employer will
send the money to the state’s Coogan Fund, and the actor can retrieve the
earnings upon turning eighteen-years-old.84
But, like for kidﬂuencers, harms to child actors are not just ﬁnancial.
Historically, child actors often faced long hours and dangerous working
conditions that harmed both physical and mental well-being.85 To address
this, states like California impose hour restrictions on how long each age
group can be on set in a given day86 and educational requirements, like
requiring a teacher to be on set.87 In California, the studio teacher is
responsible for representing the child’s interest in “working conditions,
physical surroundings, signs of the minor’s mental and physical fatigue, and
the demands placed upon the minor.”88
Notably for the purposes of this Comment, California deﬁnes the
“entertainment industry” to include any organization employing a minor in
“[m]otion pictures of any type . . . using any format . . . by any medium . . .;
photography, recording, modeling, theatrical, productions; publicity; rodeos;
circuses; musical performances; and any other performances.”89 This
deﬁnition is arguably broad enough to capture social media production, but
given the novel and powerful social media marketing industry, it was surely
not contemplated by the statutes of any state, and states are not currently
applying actor laws to social media production.
In 2018, California Assemblymember Kansen Chu proposed a bill that
would have speciﬁcally expanded child actor protections to cover social media
production.90 By the time it passed the Assembly and was signed by the
84 Id. (stating that if the parent or guardian does not supply employer with Coogan account
information within 180 days of the employment, “the employer shall forward to The Actors’ Fund
of America 15 percent of the minor’s gross earnings” and the Fund must make one attempt to contact
the child once they turn eighteen by sending a notice to the child’s last known address).
85 In perhaps the most extreme case, two child actors in “The Twilight Zone” series were killed
on set while ﬁlming a scene involving a helicopter and an exploding building. See Charles S. Tashiro,
The “Twilight” Zone of Contemporary Hollywood Production, CINEMA J., Spring 2002, at 27. It was
later discovered that these children were working illegally outside of the permitted working hours
for child actors. Id. In response to this tragedy, California revised its child acting rules to clarify
what activities are not permissible or too dangerous, though it also extended the number of hours a
child actor may work. Id. at 35.
86 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11760 (2020) (ranging from children under six months of age,
who are only allowed to work for twenty minutes per day, to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, who
can work up to six hours per day).
87 Id. (mandating how many hours of schooling child actors need per day); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 8, § 11755.2 (2020) (requiring studios to provide a teacher for minors while on set).
88 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11755.3 (2020).
89 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11751(a) (2020).
90 Chu’s News—September 2018, ASSEMBLYMEMBER KANSEN CHU DIST. 25 (Sept. 19, 2018, 10:30
AM), https://a25.asmdc.org/district-report/chus-news-september-2018 [https://perma.cc/89C9-6BUF]; A.B.
2388, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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Governor to become law, any mention of social media was removed. As
California learned through the bill’s failure, states should create regulation
more speciﬁc to the social media industry, rather than extending current child
acting laws to identically cover social media production.
III.

WEIGHING HARM TO KIDFLUENCERS AGAINST THE RIGHT
TO PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Having surveyed the historic goals and development of child labor law, it
is clear that the regime did not contemplate the meteoric rise of the social
media marketing industry. There have been some calls for kidﬂuencer
protection, but the proposals generally suggest simply extending existing
state child actor and Coogan laws to cover social media production.91 While
kidﬂuencers are probably not included under the FLSA protection for the
same reasons that child actors are exempted,92 this Comment will show that
it may also be impracticable to apply state child actor laws to kidﬂuencers
because this industry has unique harms and family law implications.
This Part discusses how producing sponsored social media content is
work, even though it is conducted at home. It goes on to highlight the many
harms the industry inﬂicts on kidﬂuencers to show that some regulation is
needed. However, it also recognizes the constitutional right that parents have
to direct the activities and upbringing of their children, ultimately concluding
that the social media context requires legislators to weigh the interest in
protecting children from harm with a parent’s right to choose the activities of
their child in a way that is distinct from traditional child acting.
A. A New Kind of Home-Work
Unlike traditional child acting, which typically occurs at a studio or theater
with a production team, social media production often takes place at home
with the family. One reason for this may be that platforms like YouTube,
TikTok, and Instagram do not allow children under the age of 13 to make their
own accounts, so the parents must be involved.93 More practically, many
kidfluencers are too young to be able to write or produce their own content,
91 See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 2388 (proposing to “include digital exhibitions under those conditions”
of existing child acting laws).
92 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text; see also Podlas, supra note 66 (arguing that
children on reality television programs do not fall under the FLSA for many of the reasons
kidﬂuencers do not either).
93 Terms
of
Service,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
10,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/
static?gl=CA&template=terms [https://perma.cc/PSB9-VK58]; Legal, TIKTOK (Feb. 2019),
https://www.tiktok.com/legal/terms-of-use?lang=en [https://perma.cc/QMP7-CANV]; Terms of Use,
INSTAGRAM (April 19, 2018), https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870 [https://perma.cc/8UW5-KG5A].
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so it has to be a family affair. As an illustration, a CBS Originals documentary
shows parents feeding lines to their children who cannot even pronounce the
word “influencer,” let alone know that they are influencers.94
Because the content creation is often managed by the parents, the
company that contracted the work has almost no control when compared to a
traditional ﬁlm set. The parents often organize the photoshoots, ﬁlm the
videos, direct their children, post the content, and ultimately control the
timeline.95 The parents, then, have almost complete control over the
conditions of the child’s work.
Parents of kidﬂuencers have insisted that their children are not working—
they are playing. In news interviews, parents often claim they are the ones
completing the work by negotiating contracts and creating the content,96 and
the kids are just “having fun.”97 There is some appeal to this view—social
media content often purports to be capturing the child’s normal activities,
rather than a rehearsed performance. If we view the content production as a
child simply being handed a toy to play with while the parents passively ﬁlm
it, the circumstances feel much less demanding of the child’s time and skill
than traditional child acting. And even if rehearsal or memorization is
required for the content, it may be tempting to liken parents ﬁlming their
children for social media to parents enrolling their children in ballet to
perform for an audience or in football to play for a crowd.
But the industry has now progressed to a point where the production of
this content cannot just be considered play—it is work. These children are
appearing in hundreds of posts per year,98 and the child provides the value to
company sponsors.99 The content may be designed to appear like the child is
playing, but the production still requires the child to use a speciﬁc product,
perhaps even by a speciﬁc deadline, and be ﬁlmed doing it for monetary gain.
As an illustration, one parent reported, “If there’re days [the kids are] totally
94 Taylor Mooney, Companies Make Millions Oﬀ Kid Influencers, and the Law Hasn’t Kept Up,
CBSN ORIGINALS (Aug. 26, 2019, 6:19 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kid-inﬂuencerscompanies-make-millions-law-hasnt-kept-up-cbsn-originals [https://perma.cc/XW87-WJVM].
95 See, e.g., Allie Volpe, How Parents of Child Influencers Package Their Kids’ Lives for Instagram,
THE ATL. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/inside-lives-childinstagram-inﬂuencers/583675 [https://perma.cc/9UYB-NFN6] (“[The mother] manages [her
daughter’s] career without an agent, ﬁelds all collaborative deals herself—[the child] earns anywhere
from $100 to $5,000 a post—and styles and photographs her toddler.”).
96 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 94 (“They say it’s a family endeavor, their kids are having fun,
and it should not necessarily be considered ‘labor.’”); Wong, supra note 2 (“The thing I always stress
is that we [the parents] work, the girls do not.”).
97 Volpe, supra note 95.
98 See, e.g., Ryan’s World, supra note 42 (accumulating 1,830 videos since its creation in 2015);
Stauﬀer Family, supra note 44 (posting more than 142 Instagram pictures in 2019).
99 See Van Kessel et al., supra note 33 (showing that videos featuring a child under the age of
thirteen receive three times as many views as those without children).
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not into it, they don’t have to be . . . [u]nless it’s paid work. Then they have
to be there.”100 Ultimately, these children are being contracted to provide a
service on a schedule for compensation. Under these circumstances, play has
become work.
B. A Snapshot of Harms Facing Kidfluencers
Given that the nature of the work itself varies between traditional child
actors and social media inﬂuencers, the harms these workers face also diﬀer
in certain respects. All child performers face some common harms—missing
school, losing privacy, and exerting labor at an age where they have less
personal agency. But the social media context introduces an additional host
of harms, most notably the total lack of ﬁnancial protection and the health
risks associated with interactive media and extreme loss of privacy.101 This
section explores these harms to demonstrate the need for some level of
regulation in the social media marketing industry.
1. Financial Exploitation
The risk of exploitation in the social media context is double-barreled—
children face exploitation by both their parents and by the companies that
sponsor them. Social media provides every parent who has access to the
internet with the potential, and perhaps delusion, of making millions of dollars
by commercializing their children. Companies capitalize on this: toy-company
Melissa & Doug offered payments and free toys to any family willing to post
content of their children playing with the company’s products, and the family
would be compensated based on how many followers they had.102
The relative accessibility of social media fame is exasperated by the trend
in parents exploiting their children, not only for money, but also for fame and
celebrity.103 There is a demonstrated willingness by some parents to push
their children in the pursuit of social media fame: “Once we got to that age
that [my son] resisted a lot, I shifted more to my daughter . . . . She is a little

Wong, supra note 2.
See infra notes 102–117 and accompanying text.
Maheshwari, supra note 11 (“The company said it would pay $10 per 1,000 followers for
individual Instagram posts and $5 per 1,000 followers for Instagram Story posts.”).
103 See Ramon Ramirez, What will it Take?: In the Wake of the Outrageous “Balloon Boy” Hoax, A
Call to Regulate the Long-Ignored Issue of Parental Exploitation of Children, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.,
617, 620 (2011) (“[N]ot only [are] children viewed as sources of money, but also as a means of
achieving fame and celebrity.”).
100
101
102
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workhorse.”104 As we saw, the Hobson family is a tragic example of the
dangers of exploitation by parents.105
Kidﬂuencers are at particular risk of ﬁnancial exploitation because there
are no regulations protecting their earnings. Unless their parents voluntarily
allow it, there is currently no mechanism to provide kidﬂuencers with legal
ownership of their earnings from social media content. These children, who
are essential to their channels’ successes, are sacriﬁcing privacy and exerting
hours of labor each week while maintaining no legal right to their
compensation. Especially if their social media work prevents the child from
excelling in school or developing other skills, or even causes widely known
reputational harm, their parents’ decision to make them a kidﬂuencer can
have serious long-term ﬁnancial eﬀects.
Moreover, kidﬂuencers are likely not considered “employees” of the
companies that sponsor them because the companies have no real control over
the child’s work.106 This means they may not be covered under most
employment statutes, thus lacking protections like wage standards, workers
compensation, and the right to unionize under the National Labor Relations
Act.107 Presumably, many of these parents are unsophisticated contract
negotiators, yet they may have to handle contracting on their child’s behalf
without the support of strong collectives or lobbying groups.108
Some states attempt to protect child actors from ﬁnancial harm through
Coogan Laws,109 but again, no states currently require Coogan trusts for social

Rosman, supra note 32.
Supra notes 2–5; see also, Mooney, supra note 94 (capturing the phenomenon of parents
using their children for fame when the father of a well-known kidﬂuencer said, “[m]y goal in life is
to become as famous as possible.”).
106 See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)) (explaining that status as an “employee” depends on many
factors centered on employer control over the work).
107 Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act excludes nonemployees, speciﬁcally
independent contractors, from the Act’s coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Accordingly, nonemployees
do not enjoy the same rights to collectively bargain that employees do under Section 7. Id. § 157.
108 See, e.g., Volpe, supra note 95 (reporting that the mother of a kidﬂuencer who makes up to
$500 per post manages all sponsorship deals for her daughter without the assistance of an agent).
109 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (2020) (“[T]he court shall require that 15 percent of the minor’s
gross earnings pursuant to the contract be set aside by the minor’s employer, except an employer of a
minor for services as an extra, background performer, or in a similar capacity, as described in [an
earlier section].”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-620(b)(1) (2019) (establishing the amount of the minor’s
gross income that is required to be set aside); LA. STAT. ANN. (2020) (“Monies placed in a trust fund
. . . shall be placed in a blocked account and no funds shall be withdrawn prior to the date the minor
attains the age of eighteen unless the minor is determined to be in necessitous circumstances by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-19 (2020) (“Whenever a child is
employed in the performing arts, the child’s parent, guardian or trustee shall establish a trust account
in the child’s state of residence for the benefit of the child within seven business days after the child’s
employment contract is signed, and the employer shall deposit fifteen percent of the child’s gross
104
105
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media inﬂuencers. Even though Coogan trusts do nothing to prevent
bargaining disparities or underpayment, they at least ensure that the child
receives some compensation for their talent and eﬀorts.
2. Health Risks
The public nature of social media, as well as the industry’s reliance on
peer approval, presents health risks to kidﬂuencers. Unsurprisingly given the
industry’s novelty, there is not much information on the psychological eﬀects
of kidﬂuencing, or even adult inﬂuencing, outside of anecdotal accounts.
While studies have indicated that social media use in general is linked with
poor body image, negative self-concept, and depression among young
people,110 there are no conclusive studies showing the eﬀects social media
fame can have on a child star.
Perhaps the most parallel context is that of reality television stars,111 though
the fact that reality television is directed and filmed by a production studio
rather than parents seems relevant to analyzing psychological harms.
Nevertheless, both engagements expose children to the “loss of privacy and
potential for humiliation.”112 Moreover, both purport to represent the child in
their authentic nature, which can cause harm to children still forming their selfidentity while subjected to criticism about their persona from a large audience.113
The extreme loss of privacy that social media inﬂuencers experience is a
unique threat to these children’s mental health and physical safety. Unlike
traditional child actors, social media inﬂuencers often ﬁlm in their own
homes, use their real names, and share their daily routines.114 Plus, the sheer
earnings directly into the child’s trust account.”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 186 (2020)
(outlining various protections for finances and wellbeing of children).
110 Joseph Firth, John Torous, Brendon Stubbs, Josh A. Firth, Genevieve Z. Steiner, Lee
Smith, Mario Alvarez-Jimenez, John Gleeson, Davy Vancampfort, Christopher J. Armitage &
Jerome Sarris, The “Online Brain,”: How the Internet May Be Changing Our Cognition, 18 WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 119, 125 (2019); see Maeve Duggan, Experiencing Online Harassment, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/experiencing-online-harassment
[https://perma.cc/U8UP-Y6GL] (finding that 37% of Americans between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-nine report “someone has tried to purposefully embarrass them” on social media, and 67% of
young adults say they were subjected to some form online harassment).
111 See DANA MITCHELL, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON ARTS, ENT., SPORTS, TOURISM, &
INTERNET MEDIA, AB 2388, at 3 (Cal. 2018) (analyzing California’s proposed kidﬂuencer bill and
highlighting a parallel between social media inﬂuencers and reality TV stars).
112 Podlas, supra note 66 at 44-45 (discussing the harms to wellbeing that young reality television
participants face); see Duggan, supra note 110 (discussing online harassment).
113 Katherine Neifeld, More than a Minor Inconvenience: The Case for Heightened Protection for
Children Appearing on Reality Television, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 447, 451-52 (2010).
114 For example, many inﬂuencers will post YouTube videos claiming to take the viewers
through their normal, daily routines. See, e.g., The Labrant Fam, Our Morning Routine!!! (Get Ready
with Us), YOUTUBE (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xKBfqcgJZ1c
[https://perma.cc/YQY3-UP84] (video of two adults and their young daughter waking up and
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volume of content that inﬂuencers are expected to post means that they are
on-camera and in front of audiences constantly.
Further, the ability for audiences to message kidﬂuencers directly on
social media puts these children at heightened risk of online harassment and
stalking. The wall between celebrities and the public is thin in the social
media context, where audiences can communicate with them directly through
the platform and track the stars’ locations.115 Stories of severe online
harassment are countless, with inﬂuencers and celebrities recounting death
threats, body shaming, disability and identity-based insults, and other
personal forms of harassment. 116 This Comment cannot suﬃciently explore
the harms to child social media stars, but it is becoming clear that the shortlived fame of the platform can have serious health consequences.117

getting ready for the day, with 8,856,584 views at the time of writing); The ACE Family, THE REAL
LIFE OF THE ACE FAMILY – “WELCOME TO OUR LIFE”, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMsSd7AUNFs
[https://perma.cc/6ZVP-62C6]
(documentary-style video where the couple takes viewers through their old dwellings, ﬁnancial
history, and home videos of their young daughter, with 12,655,555 views at the time of writing).
115 Both Facebook and Instagram allow users to message one another, similar to texting, as well
as pinpoint their location on their posts. But even if a celebrity declines to disclose their location,
cyberstalkers and other followers can use the background of the pictures and, in one extreme case,
even the reﬂection of the eyes to identify where the picture was taken. Marie C. Baca, Your
Smartphone Takes Amazing Selfies. Those Selfies Could Tell Stalkers Where You Live., WASH. POST (Oct.
16, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/16/your-smartphonetakes-amazing-selﬁes-those-selﬁes-could-tell-stalkers-where-you-live
[https://perma.cc/85QB9UYW] (“[A] man allegedly stalked a Japanese pop star after determining her location based on
reﬂections seen in her eyes in social media posts . . . . Those images helped the suspect ﬁnd her train
station. He then used Google Street View . . . to ﬁnd her home.”).
116 See Taylor Lorenz, Instagram has a Massive Harassment Problem, THE ATL. (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/instagram-has-massive-harassmentproblem/572890 [https://perma.cc/NR78-AZTR] (discussing how celebrity inﬂuencers are harassed
while using social media platforms).
117 See Jenni Gritters, How Instagram Takes a Toll on Influencers’ Brains, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.
8, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/08/instagram-inﬂuencerspsychology-social-media-anxiety [https://perma.cc/BUG4-F3MM] (“[M]aking Instagram a reliable
part of your income is a taxing process, and it can take a serious psychological toll.”); Sam Blum,
The Fatigue Hitting Influencers as Instagram Evolves, BBC WORKLIFE (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20191022-the-fatigue-hitting-inﬂuencers-as-instagramevolves [https://perma.cc/LLK8-M5VU] (recounting the stressful lifestyles of online inﬂuencers
and the disturbing toll it can take on wellbeing and mental health).
Recently, two former contestants and one former host on the reality TV show Love Island died
by suicide, to the shock of their devoted fanbase. Derrick Bryson Taylor, Caroline Flack, Who Hosted
“Love Island,” Dies by Suicide at 40, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/15/arts/caroline-ﬂack-dead.html [https://perma.cc/BPJ9-XYJ6]. Though the social media
industry is relatively new, it has parallels to reality TV in the privacy and fame impact on the stars.
The mental health harm inﬂicted by the short-lived fame of reality television stars and, we can
expect, social media stars cannot be understated.
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C. Constitutional Right to Family Autonomy
Even with these identiﬁable harms, the fact that social media production
occurs within the home and family unit raises constitutional questions about
potential regulations. The Supreme Court ﬁrst recognized a constitutional
right to parental authority in 1923, when it determined that the right “to
marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a protected liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 This view was aﬃrmed two years later,
when the Court recognized “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”119 Thus was born
a tradition of family autonomy immune from invasive state interference in
the upbringing of one’s child.
However, some twenty years after the inception of the right to parental
authority, the Court clariﬁed that this right is not without limits. The seminal
case is Prince v. Massachusetts, where the child’s custodian permitted her to
work in violation of the state’s child labor laws.120 The Court recognized a
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” speciﬁcally
concerning a parent’s decisions in raising their children.121 However, it also
recognized that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things aﬀecting the child’s welfare,” and that child
labor can be subject to more regulation than adult labor.122
Today, parental authority is exceedingly far-reaching.123 Parents can
choose what religious and moral ideas their child is exposed to,124 who their
child interacts with,125 and what extracurricular activities they are involved
in.126 These decisions are generally not reviewed by courts or agencies except
in circumstances like custody disputes or serious harm to the child.127 Still,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
321 U.S. 158, 160 (1944).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167-68.
But cf. Patrick Henigan, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public High Schools Which Provide Gay
and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional Childrearing Rights of Parents, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1996) (positing that constitutional parental authority protects four categorical
“areas of parenting” rather than a penumbra of parental functions).
124 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (clarifying that the constitutional right to
parental authority includes “the inculcation of moral standards [and] religious beliefs”).
125 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (“[T]he parents should be the ones to choose
whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas.”).
126 See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794,796 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to limit a parent’s
constitutional right to raise a child under their sincere religious beliefs, even if the parent does not
allow the child to “participate in extracurricular activities, socialize with [people outside of their
religious group], or attend college”).
127 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (“Simply because the decision of a
parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the
118
119
120
121
122
123
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like in Prince, states can and have limited parental authority where there is a
signiﬁcant interest in the health and welfare of children, including regulations
like truancy laws and vaccination mandates.128
Thus, the constitutional right to parental authority limits, but not
necessarily prohibits, potential state regulation of kidﬂuencers. Opponents of
kidﬂuencer regulations may emphasize that social media production largely
takes place at home, directed by the parents. Filming one’s child and creating
an online presence for them is arguably within a parent’s liberty to control
the upbringing of their child. Moreover, social media has dual functions for
inﬂuencers as both a source of income and a platform for self-expression.
Both Meyer and Society of Sisters upheld parental rights in part because of the
interest in self-expression and the heterogeneity of society.129 These
important considerations of family autonomy and self-expression may cast
doubt on some production regulations, like limiting the hours that a family
can create self-expressive content together, but they do not implicate ﬁnancial
regulation.
On the other hand, proponents of regulation can rely on the limiting
factors of parental authority. The Court in Prince established that states have
the power to protect children from harm, even above the wishes of their
parents, and speciﬁed child labor as an appropriate area of regulation.130
States have a substantial interest in cabining the harms these child social
media stars face, and a court could ﬁnd that this outweighs any infringement
on parental authority.131 It may follow, then, that imposing some level of
regulation on the work conditions and compensation of kidﬂuencers is well
within the state’s authority.
There is no easy answer to the question of how far state regulation of
kidﬂuencer production can go—states will have to grapple with the
constitutional issues in ways that they do not for traditional child actors.
power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or oﬃcer of the state . . . . Neither
state oﬃcials nor federal courts are equipped to review such parental decisions.”).
128 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48260-48260.5 (2020) (providing that, if a student misses
three days of school with no excuse, the pupil is truant and the parents are reminded that they are
“obligated to compel the attendance of the pupil at school,” and failure to meet this obligation may
subject them to prosecution); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120335 (2020) (mandating certain
immunizations for admission to public and private schools, though not for home schooling).
129 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (acknowledging that the state may desire
a homogeneous population, but people retain the liberty to learn and practice what they desire);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (precluding from states the general power “to
standardize its children”).
130 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 168 (1944).
131 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (limiting
parental authority to “intimate family decisions” and holding, in any event, that parents “retain
ample authority” over their children even if there is a mandatory curfew) (quoting Schleifer v. City
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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Legislators should be conscious of this when crafting social media protections
because, in some ways, regulating kidfluencers is exerting state power over the
activities of a parent and their child in their own home. Still, because content
production often qualifies as labor and subjects these children to serious
harms, some level of regulation surely passes muster. The task, then, is to
establish the boundaries of what social media production should be considered
labor and determine what kinds of regulations are practicable in this novel
landscape.
IV. PARTIAL-PROTECTION PROPOSAL
Because the substantial diﬀerences between social media inﬂuencing and
child acting imbue the former with a distinct host of dangers and family-law
considerations, states should not simply include kidﬂuencers under existing
child acting laws (assuming the state even has any regulations in place).
Though child acting laws vary among states, there are three common
categories of regulation: Coogan trusts, work permits, and workplace
conditions. At this point in the public debate and development of social
media marketing, it is practicable and desirable to provide ﬁnancial protection
to kidﬂuencers in the form of Coogan trusts. But regulation beyond that will
require more research and analysis given the concerns of over-regulating the
family unit and interfering with the uniquely fast-paced social media market.
States should not regulate social media production through labor law when
the content is unpaid because, on balance, the interest in parental authority
over the activities of their family outweighs the risk of exploitation.132 Even
for kidfluencers and their parents, social media is an outlet for self-expression,
art, and socialization. They should have the same rights to that noncommercial
expression as the general public. Of course, every post is valuable in creating
a brand, so one could imagine a system where every social media user who
earns any money on their account must adhere to permit and workplace
requirements for all content. But that overextends the regulation and does not
give proper weight to family autonomy.
Even so, these children need some level of protection, and this Comment
argues the appropriate line to separate personal expression and actual work is
when content is created for money. When the child is being paid to produce
content, they are at real and immediate risk of exploitation, and ﬁnancial
regulations, like Coogan laws, are appropriate. However, other requirements
that states typically impose on child actors and their studios, like work
132 States like New York require work permits for child actors even when the work is unpaid.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFFS. LAW § 35.01 (McKinney 2020) (applying the child-actor permit
requirements to performances “whether or not such child or any other person is to be compensated”).
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permits and on-set education, are diﬃcult, if not impossible, to apply to the
social media context as they currently exist.
A. Coogan Trusts
Though it may not be clear how much states should oversee the
production of social media content, states can readily provide ﬁnancial
protection to kidﬂuencers through Coogan trusts. Parents are typically
charged with protecting their children ﬁnancially, but parental motives
become perverse when they stand to gain millions on their child’s social media
content. Requiring Coogan trusts for kidﬂuencers protects them from the
same ﬁnancial plight that countless child stars before them endured at the
hands of their parents.133 In the interest of intrinsic fairness, these children
should be guaranteed compensation for their labor and loss of privacy, and
Coogan trusts ensure that.
California, New York, Louisiana, and New Mexico all have Coogan Laws
that require 15% of gross earnings to be deposited in a trust account for the
child actor.134 One could argue that the percentage should be lower in the
social media context because parents perform a higher percentage of the total
work than stage parents—negotiating contracts, setting up shoots, posting the
content, and more—and are therefore entitled to a higher percentage of their
child’s earnings. But we should look at the percentage from the perspective
of how much compensation the child deserves. These children are arguably
more vital to the content earnings than traditional child actors, and they are
subject to more pervasive privacy harms.135 Accordingly, the percentage
should at least match that of child actors.
Even with a strong policy interest in requiring Coogan trusts for
kidﬂuencers, the industry is complicated because of the massive volume of
inﬂuencers and because social media accounts can be used both for proﬁt and
as a personal hobby. For example, there were about 3.7 million brandsponsored posts on Instagram in 2018, and that ﬁgure has been exponentially

133 Shirley Temple, Jackie Coogan, Dana Plato, Gary Coleman, Macaulay Culkin, Drew
Barrymore, and Mary-Kate and Ashley Olsen all found themselves in a “ﬁnancial battle with their
parents after a star-studded career due to exploitation or poor money management by their parents,
agents or managers.” Shayne J. Heller, The Price of Celebrity: When a Child’s Star-Studded Career
Amounts to Nothing, 10 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 161, 164 n.23 (1999).
134 For examples of laws requiring trusts for child actors, see CAL. FAM CODE § 6752(b)(West
2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-620(b)(1) (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2133 (2020); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50-6-19 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 §§ 186-1.1, 186-3.5.
135 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (pointing out the additional privacy concerns
that come with social media fame).
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rising.136 Enforcing Coogan requirements on each of those posts that includes
a child would be a colossal undertaking. Plus, it may be less urgent to regulate
social media users who only post sponsored content for low dollar amounts
on the assumption that these children are not subject to the same long hours,
constant loss of privacy, or high-stress productions that a more
commercialized account may demand.
Accordingly, states should adopt the model of Louisiana and New Mexico,
which only require employers to deposit money into a Coogan trust for
contracts over a threshold amount.137 New Mexico only requires funds to be
deposited into a Coogan trust for contracts earning $1,000 or more, but states
should adopt a threshold amount closer to Louisiana’s $500 because individual
social media posts are often worth lower dollar ﬁgures than roles in entire
stage or movie productions.138
Setting a threshold amount where Coogan trusts become required is
appropriate in this context because it only regulates those children at risk of
ﬁnancial exploitation, thus minimizing state intrusion on the family unit.
That is, if a kidﬂuencer can collect $500 or more for a single post, it is likely
they have amassed a following and signiﬁcant online presence,139 thereby
triggering the concerns of ﬁnancial exploitation and other harms mentioned
earlier.140 But the threshold excludes families who may use social media
primarily as a hobby and have not developed the level of commercial
operation that puts these children at signiﬁcant risk. Moreover, the parents
of kidﬂuencers may be less sophisticated in entertainment regulation than a
child-actor agent, for example, and until their child is making signiﬁcant

136 Instagram Influencer Marketing is a $1.7 Billion Dollar Industry, MEDIAKIX (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://mediakix.com/blog/instagram-inﬂuencer-marketing-industry-size-how-big/
[https://perma.cc/DB99-2MAZ ].
137 LA. STAT. ANN.§ 51:2132 (2020) (“The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to any
contract in which a minor is employed or agrees to render artistic or creative services for
compensation of ﬁve hundred dollars or more . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-19(I) (2020)
(“[Coogan Laws] appl[y] only to contracts in an amount equal to or greater than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) in gross earnings.”).
138 “Nano-influencers,” defined as having between 500 and 5,000 followers, may accept products
in lieu of payment for sponsored posts and, when accepting cash, make an average of $315 per YouTube
video and $100 per picture posted to Instagram. Blake Droesch, How Much Are Brands Paying Influencers?,
EMARKETER (July 16, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/how-much-are-brands-payinginfluencers [https://perma.cc/RU64-8ZML]. “Power influencers,” with 30,000 to 500,000 followers,
make on average $782 per YouTube video and $507 per Instagram picture. Id. In contrast, the primary
actors union standardizes pay for a single day of theatrical performing at $1,030. SAG-AFTRA Theatrical
Wage
Table,
SAG-AFTRA,
https://www.sagaftra.org/files/20202023CBAWages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJV2-8TCQ].
139 $507 per post puts an inﬂuencer in the category of “power inﬂuencer” with up to 500,000
followers. Droesch, supra note 135.
140 Supra notes 101–17 and accompanying text.
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money, the state should not expect them to know regulations as niche as
Coogan Laws.
Still, there are many questions left open. Inﬂuencers often have several
social media accounts, and kidﬂuencers frequently have their own channels
but appear regularly on their parents’ channels as well.141 Unless a sponsorship
contract expresses how much of the payment goes to each family member, it
could be diﬃcult to discern how much of the earnings should be attributed to
the child and whether the threshold amount was met to invoke a Coogan trust
requirement. We can look to California, which exempts background
performers from Coogan coverage,142 and states like Pennsylvania, which
apply labor regulation to child reality show stars only when the program
“expressly depends upon the minor’s participation” and the “participation is
substantial.”143 Similarly here, if the contract does not specify how much
money is directed to the child, the threshold calculation could be apportioned
based on how much of the content “depends upon the minor’s participation”
and in which the child’s participation is “substantial.”144
Importantly, Coogan trusts have three major shortcomings, in both this
context and for child actors more broadly. First, under the California model,
when parents do not set up Coogan trusts, 15% of the gross earnings are
deposited into a state fund instead of given to the family.145 Though the state
is obligated to send notice of the retained funds once the child turns
eighteen,146 there is a real possibility that the former-child-actor cannot be
reached or redeem the funds, so the state could eﬀectively profit oﬀ its child
labor law.
141 Every member of the Labrant family has their own Instagram page, including 7-year-old
Everleigh Rose (5.1 million followers), 1-year-old Posie (1.7 million followers), and new-born Zealand
(562,000
followers).
Everleigh
Rose
Bryant
(@everleighrose),
INSTAGRAM,
https://www.instagram.com/everleighrose/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/QS69-CVZU]; Posie Rayne
LaBrant
(@posierayne),
INSTAGRAM,
https://www.instagram.com/posierayne/?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/28WD-UGL6]; Zealand LaBrant (@zealand.labrant), INSTAGRAM , https://www.
instagram.com/zealand.labrant/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/8P32-9UFU].
They also all appear on each family member’s page. The family has a joint YouTube channel (12.8 million
followers), and Everleigh Rose also has her own (3.51 million subscribers). The LaBrant Fam, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4-CH0epzZpD_ARhxCx6LaQ/featured [https://perma.cc/ZN6G92CX]; Everleigh Rose, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHo2Gib_Jx09ym3xDKjyGhg
[https://perma.cc/CA38-FAAX].
142 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020) (exempting a child who works as “an extra,
background performer, or in a similar capacity” from Coogan Laws).
143 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 40.5 (West 2020).
144 Id.
145 FAM. § 6752 (stating that if the parent or guardian does not supply the employer with
Coogan account information within 180 days of the employment, “the employer shall forward to
The Actors’ Fund of America 15 percent of the minor’s gross earnings”)
146 Id. (requiring that the Fund make one attempt to contact the child once they turn eighteen
by sending a notice to the child’s last known address).
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Second, approximately 8.4 million households were unbanked in America
in 2017.147 The Coogan law structure requires these families to set up bank
accounts, regardless of their preferences. This is especially harmful to
undocumented immigrants and citizens without the forms of identiﬁcation
required to set up a bank account.
Third, and most niche to the social media context, influencers are often
paid with products rather than money, especially when they are starting out.148
Coogan trusts cannot protect children who are paid in products or services.
Nevertheless, kidfluencers with some of the largest followings who arguably
suffer the most loss-of-privacy harm are paid huge amounts of cash,149 so the
law would at least be protecting those children at the height of exploitation.
Though the Coogan trust structure is not perfect, it can be readily applied
to the social media context and serve as a ﬁrst step in protecting this new
generation of exploited talent.
B. Work Permits
Coogan trusts provide ﬁnancial protection to child performers, but, as
discussed above, many of the harms facing kidﬂuencers are not ﬁnancial in
nature.150 There have been calls for work-permit requirements for social
media inﬂuencers to preempt some of those harms.151 But the issue is not as
cut and dry as it might seem, and states should conduct research and debate
before imposing a permit requirement.
Currently, twenty-six states require child actors to obtain work permits
for entertainment work.152 California, for example, requires children to renew
the permit each year and verify school record, attendance, and health.153 New
York’s child actor laws require a permit for New York residents, even if the
work is conducted outside of the state, and for non-residents who conduct
creative services within the state.154 This would of course be diﬃcult to extend
to social media kidﬂuencers because the content creation is mobile, meaning

147 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NAT’L SURV. OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2017).
148 Maheshwari, supra note 12 (“For most nanoinﬂuencers, money isn’t part of the deal. Free
products are viewed as fair compensation . . . .”).
149 Maheshwari, supra note 11.
150 Supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 23 (arguing in favor of extending child labor laws to social media
stars); Lambert, supra note 23 (citing a lobbyist in California who is a proponent of requiring permits
because parents “may be unprepared for a kidﬂuencer’s fame and unequipped to handle it”).
152 Child Entertainment Laws as of January 1, 2020, U.S. DEP. OF LAB. (Jan. 2020),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor/entertainment [https://perma.cc/H4FB-L47M].
153 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11753(a) (2020).
154 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 § 186-2.1(b) (2020).
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any inﬂuencer who posts about a trip to New York for proﬁt or
complementary services may be expected to ﬁle for a work permit.
To be sure, there would be impactful beneﬁts if work permits were
required for kidﬂuencers. First, a permitting scheme like in California or New
York would ensure that the social media work is not excessively interfering
with the child’s education because it would require a school oﬃcial to verify
the child’s academic and attendance records.155 Second, because the permits
would have to be renewed periodically, it would require active
acknowledgement by the parents that their child is a worker. That is, parents
would be reminded of the sacriﬁces their kids are making and that this activity
is legally recognized as work, not just play. Third, parents who are registered
with the state may be less likely to include their children in explicit or
dangerous content out of fear of state monitoring. And fourth, states could
collect data to inform future policy decisions in this growing industry.
Nevertheless, requiring work permits akin to the child actor context may
be impracticable in the kidﬂuencer industry. First, social media posting is
mobile and global, and it is infeasible to require families to apply for permits
in every state where the child ﬁlms sponsored content. Second, and perhaps
most problematic, the industry is much faster-paced than traditional
entertainment. For a studio actor, the child’s guardian can apply for a permit
with a fairly accurate idea of what the work will entail, the time frame, and
the location. Social media deals can be made and completed within hours, so
permitting would not be as accurate. Further, permits take time to get
approved. When a video goes “viral,” the kidﬂuencer may need to capitalize
on that opportunity immediately because the attention span of social media
users is progressively shrinking.156
Moreover, as with permits for child actors, states can charge fees and thus
create a barrier to entry. These fees are not negligible—in California, for
example, the initial application fee for a child-performer permit is $198 and
the yearly renewal fee is currently $166.157 This means any child who gains a
155 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1308.6 (West 2020) (empowering the Labor Commission to conduct
necessary investigations to ensure permits are only granted to child performers if the work
environment is proper, “not detrimental to the health of the minor,” and the minor’s education will
not be “neglected or hampered” by the work); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 151 (McKinney 2020) (requiring the
child performer to provide evidence of “satisfactory academic performance” for each semester of the
employment as a condition of the work permit).
156 See Phillipp Lorenz-Spreen, Bjarke Mørch Mønsted, Philipp Hövel & Sune Lehmann,
Accelerating Dynamics of Collective Attention, NATURE COMMC’NS, Apr. 15, 2019, at 2,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09311-w [https://perma.cc/GWL7-D8XM] (reporting
that empirical evidence shows a global trend toward “shorter intervals of collective attention given
to each cultural item” on social media).
157 Child Performer Services Permit – Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CAL. DEPT. OF INDUS. RELS.
(May 2019), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Child_performer_services_permit_FAQs.htm#fe16 [https://
perma.cc/3X7N-8W65].
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large following but cannot afford the permit fee would not be allowed to accept
sponsorships even though they are doing the same work as other children.
Beyond a financial burden, some families may be deterred from entering the
market because of their apprehension about registering with the state.
Again, this work takes place in the home and is largely directed by the
parents158—on balance, a state could reasonably decide that the doubtless
beneﬁts of a permit system do not outweigh the intrusion on the family unit
or the unworkability of permitting in this fast-paced industry.
C. Production Regulations
Though there have been calls for states to impose Coogan trust and
permit requirements for child social media inﬂuencers, there has not been
mainstream attention to the other common child actor regulations,
speciﬁcally concerning work hours, conditions, and on-set teachers. Like
permits, these regulations would help protect the welfare of child workers,
but they are both diﬃcult to implement and arguably an excessive intrusion
on the family unit.
Surely regulating the hours, conditions, and education of child performers
beneﬁts them and helps protect them from the harms of exploitation. As
described above, ﬁnancial exploitation is not the only threat facing
kidﬂuencers—there are also risks of pervasive privacy loss, psychological
harm, and excessive hours because the work is constant and mobile.159
Limiting the hours that parents and companies can work with kidﬂuencers
would ensure that they have some private life outside of social media, and
requiring certain workplace conditions that must be approved by an
employer-hired teacher might protect kids in dangerous environments, like
the Hobson children.160
But these regulations could be diﬃcult and even impossible to impose.
Even if the state set an hour limit that these children can work, the only way
to enforce that rule would be to monitor the families within their own homes,
which would be an overstep by the state.161 A state might consider a selfreporting enforcement process where, if there is a report of excessive working
hours, the parents must log the hours the child works each week, including
preparation and ﬁlming. Though this approach could alleviate some of the
concerns regarding home intrusion by the state, self-reporting may not be
See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1065)
(making clear that states have restricted authority to search people’s homes for criminal enforcement).
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eﬀective and would still enable the state to granularly monitor the activities
between parent and child at home.
Similar issues would arise if a state were to impose child-actor education
requirements on kidﬂuencers. California, for example, requires studios to
provide on-set teachers to educate the child performers and also to represent
the child’s interest in health and welfare.162 States cannot simply apply studioteacher requirements of this nature to the social media inﬂuencer context
because that would require parents or corporate sponsors to hire teachers to
be “on set” in the family’s home. The imposition is suitable for a studiosetting, outside of a family’s home and with a signiﬁcant budget for a longerterm project. But states cannot expect parents to meet these standards inside
their home, with a single-family budget, and with a less sophisticated
knowledge of the law. Whether states can constitutionally impose hometeaching requirements like this on parents is a live question,163 but parents do
have the right generally to direct the education of their children.164 And in
any event, the point stands that an on-set teacher requirement is unworkable
in this industry.
Until policymakers can construct more appropriate workplace regulations
for social media production, child welfare laws could theoretically suﬃce as a
backstop to child abuse and neglect. Regulations about content production,
including education requirements and workplace safety mandates, duplicate
many states’ current laws regarding truancy and child abuse.165 Of course
protecting children from excessive hours and providing an additional agency
overseeing these children’s safety is desirable, but until states decide the
appropriate level of regulation, there are at least existing safety regulations.

See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the limits of the parental right to direct a child’s education have not been settled,
especially in the homeschooling context. Because states, federal courts, and scholars disagree on how
much the state may regulate parental education within the home, the question of on-set teachers for
at-home inﬂuencers is also unclear. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he right to be free from all reporting requirements and ‘discretionary’ state oversight
of a child’s home-school education has never been recognized.”). See generally, Billy Gage Raley, Safe
at Home: Establishing a Fundamental Right to Homeschooling, 2017 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 59-60 (2017)
(collecting cases and articles to show that the question of whether homeschooling is constitutionally
protected is not yet resolved).
164 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–5 (1925) (continuing the reasoning of Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control”). This right is not without limits, as indicated
by debate over whether there is or should be a constitutional right to homeschool one’s children.
165 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48264 (West 2020) (allowing school and state oﬃcers to
arrest students found skipping school without an excuse, and imposing procedures for repeat truants,
including community service and state programs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d (West 2020)
(providing an example of state child abuse laws).
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Fundamentally, even though this Comment argues that kidﬂuencers are
workers who need protection and compensation, it is also true that social
media is simultaneously a personal and private expression of self as well as a
job. Financial protection is possible through Coogan trusts because they
simply guarantee the child receives some compensation for their labor. But
other regulations regarding workplace conditions intrude on the actual
activities of the family unit. The balance between family autonomy and childactor protection is diﬃcult in this context, so states and the federal
government should continue to study this nuanced area before imposing
regulations or simply adding kidﬂuencers to existing child actor laws.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the “kidﬂuencer” has introduced a new form of labor that is
unregulated in our state-based child acting law regime. Children spend hours
per day producing high-valued content at the direction of their parents with
no ﬁnancial or personal protection besides the good will of their parents.
Although states do not have the right to unduly intervene in a parent’s raising
of their child, states should at least provide ﬁnancial protection through the
Coogan trust model outlined above.166 Other typical child acting regulations,
like work permits and workplace condition requirements, would indeed
protect the child but may be unworkable or overly invasive in the social media
context where the work occurs at home with the parents.
Underlying this entire discussion is the question of whether social media
labor regulations could be more eﬀective as federal law rather than state
based. Indeed, in 2015, Congresswoman Grace Meng introduced a bill that
would federally regulate the number of hours that child actors can work and
impose a federal Coogan trust requirement.167 Federal regulation may be even
more ﬁtting for social media production, which is mobile and greatly aﬀects
interstate economy. Even if kidﬂuencing is not added under the standard
FLSA regulations, these children may have an interest in federal protection
that merits their own tailored regulations.
But until federal law begins to accommodate social media production, any
protection must be created at the state level. Social media marketing is new,
growing, and distinct from any other industry, including child acting. Thus,
states should not merely add the words “and social media inﬂuencers” to
existing child acting laws. Instead, states should consider imposing Coogan
trust requirements for immediate ﬁnancial protection and continue to
research and reﬁne the appropriateness of other regulations.
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Supra notes 133–50 and accompanying text.
Child Performers Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 3383, 114th Cong. (2015).

